Agile And Adaptable

Russia’s war in Ukraine has triggered the worst security crisis facing Europe since the end of the Cold War. It brought a major conventional war of aggression to the European continent and enormous human suffering, but in doing so it has also unified and reenergized the NATO alliance and accelerated efforts to reconstitute transatlantic defense and deterrence. Assessing Russia’s performance in the war thus far, and how the Russian military is evolving as a result, is an important part of that effort.

Russia demonstrated considerable military weaknesses after its full-scale invasion began in February 2022, and it faces equipment, ammunition, and manpower shortages. Moscow’s efforts to boost industrial production and circumvent Western sanctions and export controls have not brought as much success as intended. Building on two prior CSIS studies, Out of Stock? Assessing the Impact of Sanctions on Russia’s Defense Industry, and A War of Attrition: Assessing the Impact of Equipment Shortages on Russian Military Operations in Ukraine, this report first examines Russia’s residual military threat to NATO. It finds this threat is reduced in the near term, but that NATO must still grapple with Russia’s nuclear arsenal, the advanced systems it has not fully utilized, internal instability, and operations below the threshold of armed conflict. Moreover, Russia remains a learning adversary and its strategic objectives have not changed. Russia will adapt during the attritional war and the reconstitution period that will follow. Additionally, it has international partners — of greatest concern is the role of China — that may help it stagger through the war and recover its strength.

The second part of this report examines the opportunities and challenges facing the United States and its NATO allies and partners in Europe as they adapt their defense strategies, planning, and forces in response to the changing Russian military threat over the short term and the new security landscape in Europe. To date, U.S. and allied strategies have focused on supporting Ukraine as much as possible, preserving strength and unity in NATO while managing escalation risks, and leveraging economic tools to constrain Russia’s aggression and alter its political calculus. Russia’s near-term weakness offers the United States and NATO a window of opportunity to right the imbalances in their own defense strategies, capabilities, and capacity while continuing to support Ukraine. This window of opportunity will last so long as Russia is tied down in a war of attrition, managing internal instability, and struggling to ramp up domestic production and circumvent sanctions, and so long as China hesitates to pay the diplomatic and economic costs of fully or openly supporting Russia’s war effort.

More specifically, this report argues that both the United States and its NATO allies ought to expand their understanding of Russia’s domestic political environment and international partnerships, especially Russia-China relations. Additionally, the United States should focus on forward-stationed enablers in Europe, augmenting European efforts to counter Russia, especially with stronger counter-uncrewed aerial vehicle (UAV), anti-armor, and electronic warfare (EW) capabilities, and cheaper, more ubiquitous air and missile defense capabilities. NATO, meanwhile, must grapple with Russia’s enduring nuclear capabilities and political instability, prepare for intensified Russian hybrid operations, strengthen undersea infrastructure defense capabilities, and invest in increased capacity that can be realized while Moscow reconstitutes. Finally, the entire transatlantic community should take steps now to strengthen Ukraine over the long run as a bulwark of Euro-Atlantic defense and deterrence.

In sum, Russia’s poor conventional performance during the first year of the war provides the United States and its NATO allies and partners with a window of opportunity to right the imbalances and shortcomings in their military capabilities and capacity. Clearly, the Russian military retains some strengths, which the alliance must continue to grapple with, but it has also demonstrated significant weaknesses. So long as Russia is bogged down in a war of attrition and focused on defending its front line in eastern and southern Ukraine, the West ought to strengthen its advantages and target Russia’s demonstrated weaknesses. Seizing the moment through agility and adaptation is key to securing the Euro-Atlantic region today and tomorrow.

Introduction

Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine, now in its second year, has triggered the worst security crisis facing Europe since the end of the Cold War. It has also reenergized the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), brought political unity to transatlantic relations, and accelerated efforts to reconstitute transatlantic defense and deterrence. The United States and its European allies and partners have supported Ukraine’s resistance by investing historic sums into humanitarian, financial, and military aid for Ukraine. Their strategies have focused on arming and training Ukrainian military forces, preserving strength and unity in NATO while managing escalation risks, and leveraging economic tools to shape the Kremlin’s calculus and constrain its aggression. These economic tools included unprecedented sanctions on Russian entities, export controls, efforts to cut dependence on Russian energy, and the imposition of a price cap on Russian oil.

Early in the war, U.S. officials presented these economic tools as a means of constraining Russia’s aggression and hastening its decline. This report is part of a series of CSIS Europe, Russia, and Eurasia Program studies on this topic. The first report finds that Western sanctions have had some important impacts on Russia’s production of key weapons, especially those that require foreign-made technologies. It argues, however, that Russia has proven more resilient and adaptable than expected in the West. Moscow is modernizing older equipment, relying on prewar stockpiles, and circumventing sanctions through trade diversions and illegal activities. As a result, Western-origin products still find their way into Russian weapons, even as Moscow leans on lower-quality alternatives. The second report focuses on Russia’s efforts to mobilize defense production and argues that the Kremlin can replenish its forces at levels sufficient to continue the war. However, its manpower and equipment losses will limit Russia’s ability to engage in high-intensity, conventional operations in Central Asia, the Middle East, or the Caucasus, at least for the near future.

While the previous reports offer recommendations on how the United States and the European Union might strengthen sanctions, improve sanctions implementation, and curb illegal activities, this report focuses on Russia’s changing military threat to NATO as a result of losses in the war and its efforts to circumvent sanctions, and it asks how the United States and NATO might adapt their military approach toward Russia as a result. First, this study explores the implications of Russia’s performance in Ukraine and its sanctions evasion on Russia’s threat to the Euro-Atlantic region (over the next two to four years). Russia can still field tanks, missiles, uncrewed aerial vehicles (UAVs), and electronic warfare (EW) capabilities effectively in Ukraine, though it struggles with cross-domain operations. Russia also holds some advanced systems in reserve, retains its nuclear stockpile, and is likely to lean on hybrid challenges to NATO while it reconstitutes its conventional military forces and attempts to restore its nuclear coercive reputation.

Additionally, Moscow has received some military support from partners, including Iran and the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK), and tacit political support from numerous nonaligned countries across the so-called Global South. Of greatest concern is the potential role the People’s Republic of China (PRC) could yet play in the conflict if it decides to supply Russia’s arms. Given the outlook for Russia’s military potential over the short term, this study explores whether, how, and to what extent the United States and its NATO allies in Europe ought to adjust key aspects of their strategies, operational planning, defense planning, force structure, and force posture in response. Two sections — the first on the U.S. approach to Russia, and the second on NATO’s approach — focus on how best to respond to the changing Russian military threat over the near term to bolster defense and deterrence for NATO while continuing to strengthen Ukraine’s military advantages on the battlefield. Each section includes practical policy recommendations for decisionmakers.

Russia’s Short-Term Military Potential

The mutiny of Wagner forces against the Russian government potentially carries serious implications for the Russian military, its war effort in Ukraine, and the threat it poses to the West. In the short run, the fact that Wagner has essentially left the battlefield could lessen the disunity of command that has plagued Russian forces since the earliest weeks of the war. In theory, this development could strengthen the hand of the Kremlin as it directs the war effort. However, the withdrawal of most Wagner forces from the front — at this point, it remains unclear how many will take up the Kremlin’s offer of Defence Ministry contracts — means that Moscow could have 25,000 fewer experienced and capable fighters available for its war effort and who could theoretically be utilized against the West. This would aggravate the already challenging manpower situation that confronts the Russian military. Hence, drawing definitive conclusions regarding the mutiny’s short-term operational impact is still difficult at this early stage.

In contrast, six other factors stand out as relevant for evaluating changes to Russia’s near-term military threat to NATO. First, sanctions have restricted the flow of some sensitive dual-use technologies into Russia, including technologies with U.S.-origin products, and they raised Russia’s costs for acquiring them. During the latter half of 2022 and throughout 2023, Russia struggled to find spare parts for tanks and satellites, and its defense industry proved unable to produce the arms necessary to meet basic needs on the battlefield. In particular, the restrictions constrained Russia’s access to high-quality optical systems, ball bearings, machine tools, engines, and microchips. Russia has been unsuccessful in pivoting to large-scale domestic production for these items, and that has imposed some limitations on its ability to field higher-end military capabilities in the war. For example, Russia’s ability to produce advanced Kinzhal hypersonic missiles has fallen from roughly 30 per month to about 10 per month. Therefore, because of sanctions, Russia’s doctrinal emphasis on indirect fires should continue, even as the quantity, quality, and accuracy of those fires diminishes over time.

Six factors stand out in evaluating changes to Russia’s near-term military threat:

1. the impact of sanctions in restricting technology flows into Russia;

2. the Kremlin’s attempts to circumvent sanctions and export controls;

3. Russia’s decision to keep some ground and air systems in reserve;

4. Russia’s limited ability to synchronize cross-domain operations;

5. additional Russian capabilities generally underutilized in what is mostly a land war; and

6. the role of third-party suppliers.

Second, despite the sanctions’ ability to achieve some success in limiting Russia’s industrial capacity, the Kremlin has “created new ways to circumvent export-control restrictions and secure much-needed foreign components to sustain and produce its weapons systems and wage war on Ukraine.” This has occurred through the “Eurasian roundabout” — patterns of trade diversion through the Caucasus and Central Asia. In particular, Russia has succeeded in routing sanctioned items and dual-use trade through the Balkans, Turkey, Iran, the Caucasus, Central Asia, and China. This has resulted in a continued supply of rudimentary drones, microchip components, aircraft engine parts, jamming technology, and navigation equipment, among others. Clearly, Moscow’s new sanctions-evading supply chain will not permit Russia to acquire or produce equipment at prewar levels of quality or quantity. Nonetheless, the limited but steady flow of sanctioned items indicates that Moscow could continue an attritional approach to the war. Russia assumes time is on its side vis-à-vis Ukraine’s manpower and the West’s ability and will to continue supplying Ukraine.

Third, the Kremlin has kept some of Russia’s ground and air systems in reserve, despite the ostensible utility such systems might have in its war against Ukraine. Russia is fielding older models of its tanks after taking heavy losses of T-72B3 MBTs, including some that predate Russia’s 2011-initiated modernization program. Meanwhile, its advanced tanks, including the T-14 Armata and the T-90M Proryv, have seen only limited use in the war. Similarly, Russia’s advanced Su-57 Felon aircraft — a fifth-generation multirole stealth fighter — made only limited appearances in the war, and typically from outside Ukraine’s borders. There may not be enough of these systems for Moscow to make effective use of them in the war. However, there are other plausible reasons Moscow might limit the use of these systems in Ukraine: to reserve them for defense and deterrence against the perceived threat from NATO, to limit their exposure to Western intelligence gathering, or to prevent embarrassment — and lost foreign military sales revenue — if these systems fail to perform on the battlefield as advertised. Regardless, the United States and its NATO allies must prepare for their potential use in the Ukraine war or if Russia escalates horizontally elsewhere.

Fourth, Russia’s ability to synchronize cross-domain operations has proven low, and it is likely to remain very limited over the near term. Cross- or joint multi-domain operations entail the use of capabilities across all the warfighting domains — ground, air, sea, cyber, and space — to create and exploit relative advantages to defeat enemy forces or achieve other objectives. Russia’s military refers to this as “multi-sphere” warfare and treats it as more of a strategic concept than an operational one. Early in the war, Russian forces failed to effectively coordinate between land power, air power, and long-range fires, explaining at least in part Moscow’s inability to leverage military advances and retain seized territory. More recently, Russia’s inability to synchronize operations does not appear to have improved, reflecting the persistence of cross-domain shortcomings, long-standing organizational and leadership challenges, and the high casualty rate among Russia’s better-trained military personnel. Despite the removal of the Wagner organization from the battlefield, these weaknesses cannot likely be overcome in the foreseeable future.

Fifth, Russia has capabilities that appear to be of limited utility in the land war against Ukraine, but which remain potent and must be taken into consideration by the United States and NATO. This is especially the case for Russia’s undersea capabilities, cyber capabilities, anti-satellite capabilities, and its nuclear arsenal. Russia still holds significant undersea capabilities with which it can challenge NATO, including its Kilo-class attack submarines and its Borey-class ballistic missile submarines. Collectively, these subs can perform a wide array of military activities of concern for the alliance, including conventional cruise missile launches, undersea infrastructure attacks, nuclear deterrence, espionage, minelaying, or other attacks against adversary surface fleets.

In the cyber domain, Western analysts disagree over whether Russia has fully exploited its cyber capabilities in the war in Ukraine. Russia launched the ViaSat attack — aimed at impacting Ukraine’s communications systems — an hour prior to its full-scale invasion, and it launched other early attacks, but they were effectively countered. However, it can also be argued that Russia’s cyber capabilities can be diverse and creative. For instance, Russia’s APT28, a cyber spy group active since 2007 and also known as Fancy Bear, successfully targeted foreign government and military organizations, most notably the 2016 Democratic National Committee. Another hacker group known as APT29 or Cozy Bear, part of Russia’s foreign intelligence, previously breached the U.S. Departments of Treasury and Commerce along with other government agencies. Western knowledge of Russia’s cyber capabilities tends to be more speculative than it is for other weapons systems. Some argue these groups are reinforced by a cadre of civilian engineers in service of the Kremlin, yet there are reasons to believe Moscow’s cyber capabilities are weaker than previously assumed because of organizational infighting, the number of those fleeing Russia, and other challenges.

Over the last several years, the Russian military has also developed and tested anti-satellite weapons, including direct-ascent and on-orbit weapons. Experts argue that Russia seeks to exploit perceived U.S. reliance on a variety of satellites for navigation, targeting, and intelligence gathering. Developing and fielding anti-satellite capabilities is viewed within the Russian military as a key element in preventing an incapacitating first strike by U.S. hypersonic, cruise, and ballistic missiles, all of which are aided by satellite-enabled data. Although Moscow has certainly used its EW capabilities to jam satellite communications and has threatened to attack “quasi-civilian” satellites that it deems are aiding Kyiv’s efforts, Russia has yet to leverage its anti-satellite capabilities in the war. Regardless, they remain a significant threat to U.S. and allied systems that depend on satellites.

Meanwhile, in the nuclear realm, Russia remains a superpower. As of early 2023, Russia is estimated to maintain a stockpile of approximately 4,489 nuclear warheads assigned for use by its long-range strategic launchers and shorter-range non-strategic nuclear forces. It is likely that Russia remained under the New START warhead limit through 2022, though Moscow’s suspension of the treaty will complicate any U.S. assessments of its warhead declarations in the future. Given the poor performance of Russia’s ground forces and long-range conventional capability in Ukraine, Russia is likely to enhance its reliance on nuclear weapons for deterrence and defense going forward. Concretely, this will most likely manifest in Russia’s continued modernization of its nuclear forces, versatile efforts to restore the credibility of its nuclear coercive reputation, and adjustments to its deterrence posture.

In the nuclear realm, Russia remains a superpower.

Russia’s process of nuclear modernization is set to continue in both the strategic and non-strategic domains, with a focus on enhanced defense penetration capabilities. For example, Russia is set to produce a new version of its RS-24 Yars intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) with a harder-to-intercept warhead configuration. Modernization efforts also extend to the missile defense domain, with new systems under development intended to supplement and in some cases replace older systems. It is possible that Russia’s nuclear saber-rattling — intended not only to deter NATO’s direct entry into the Ukraine war but also to slow or prevent Western military support for Ukraine — has worn itself out. If so, Russia may go beyond nuclear rhetoric to restore its coercive reputation. It could conceivably conduct a nuclear test. Its military may also be contemplating intermediate rungs on the escalation ladder, such as new ways to manipulate alert levels, or “strategic gestures” including demonstrative activities involving its nuclear forces. Some Russian intellectuals have moved to call more openly for reviving the fear of nuclear war in the West and for moving up the escalation ladder. While these voices do not officially represent the government, the Kremlin may be engaging in strategic messaging through the Moscow-based expert community. Moreover, Moscow is highly unlikely to resume full implementation of New START, and it may be less likely to agree to negotiated limits on its overall nuclear arsenal. Should Russia decide to exceed New START limits, before or after 2026, its capacity to increase deployed warheads without adding a single additional delivery system is estimated to be considerable, even though some posit Russia is economically ill-positioned to sustain a nuclear arms race.

In terms of doctrine, Russian military analysts have written a flurry of reflections over the past year on deterrence and escalation in an era of U.S. “prompt global strike,” betraying a continued concern with the U.S. ability to attack strategic or nuclear targets in Russia without resorting to nuclear use. It remains conceivable that Russia will consider limited nuclear use if faced with what it deems to be threats to regime survival. It maintains a formidable and diverse set of theater-range nuclear weapons, and understandings of what it considers existential threats to the Russian Federation per its nuclear doctrine may well expand as its leaders’ sense of conventional weakness and vulnerability increases. Russia’s pursuit of a wide range of nuclear weapons suited for both deterrence and regional war fighting reinforces this threat, as does its purported/announced deployment of short-range nuclear weapons to Belarus.

Finally, in addition to these Russia-centric factors that help elucidate Moscow’s changing military potential over the near term, the role of third-party suppliers is very significant. With loitering munitions from Iran, artillery shells from North Korea, and arms and ammunition from South Africa, Moscow is leveraging relationships with other regimes to address what even Putin acknowledges as shortcomings in capacity. These suppliers could play a role in helping Russia endure Ukraine’s counteroffensives and solidify its battlefield gains. Of potentially greater significance, though, is the role that the PRC might play. It is possible the PRC will continue to eschew becoming (or being seen to become) an explicit source of arms and militarily relevant technology for Russia to avoid the resulting costs to its economy. The PRC may, however, continue to facilitate or quietly acquiesce to trade diversions and the illegal activities Russia is exploiting, including trade through Hong Kong. Judging by official statements, as well as by Beijing’s apparent desire to position itself as a peacemaker, this may remain the extent of its involvement. On the other hand, if Beijing fails to maintain its balancing act — supporting Russia while trying to avoid Western sanctions — the PRC could become a more explicit facilitator of Russia’s war effort. Its rise as an “arsenal of authoritarianism” would have profound effects on the West’s efforts to deter Russia in the short run.

With these six factors and Russia’s near-term threat to the Euro-Atlantic region in mind, the rest of this report will examine the military implications for the United States and its NATO allies. Specifically, it will address whether, how, and to what extent the transatlantic community should adjust key aspects of its strategies, operational plans, defense plans, force structure, and force posture over the near term to strengthen defense and deterrence vis-à-vis Russia while continuing to support Ukraine and strengthen other vulnerable partners. To accomplish this, the report will first examine how the United States might adapt its approach to Russia’s military threat to Europe, given Washington’s focus on its pacing challenge in the Indo-Pacific theater. Second, it will examine how NATO as a whole might alter its strategy, planning, and posture to reflect the changing Russian threat over the next two to four years.

Reassessing the U.S. National Approach to Russia

The U.S. approach to Russia is driven by the Biden administration’s 2022 National Defense Strategy (NDS), which was released to the public in October of last year and woven together with two other important defense strategy documents — the Missile Defense Review and the Nuclear Posture Review (NPR) — to achieve a coherent approach across the Department of Defense. Though the complete versions of all three documents remain classified, the 80-page unclassified compilation paints a clear picture of the administration’s strategic approach toward Russia. The following section analyzes its strengths and weaknesses over the near term, given preliminary lessons learned during the war in Ukraine and the failure of Western sanctions and export controls to radically reshape the Kremlin’s political calculus or thwart Russia’s aggression. It asks whether the U.S. approach is fit for purpose as Washington seeks to parry Russia’s efforts to threaten U.S. vital interests in Europe and elsewhere.

The 2022 NDS characterizes Russia as an “acute threat,” and it commits the United States to providing leadership, enabling capabilities, and deepening interoperability with its NATO allies and partners to deter Russia’s aggression against U.S. interests and treaty allies and to strengthen vulnerable partners. Russia’s acute threat is not on the same level of what the same strategy identifies as the “pacing challenge” posed to U.S. interests by the PRC. This prioritization in the 2022 NDS has reignited robust debate in Washington about the relationship between the PRC and Russia, important linkages between the European and Indo-Pacific theaters, and the trade-offs that may be required to deter both adversaries sequentially or simultaneously across these theaters. The prioritization makes sense given several factors: Russia’s demonstrated military weaknesses; evidence of fissures within its political and military elites (as borne out by the Wagner mutiny); the size of the PRC’s economy and population; the growing capacity and capabilities of the People’s Liberation Army; and the NDS’s assessments of Beijing’s “coercive and increasingly aggressive endeavor to refashion the Indo-Pacific region and the international system to suit its interests and authoritarian preferences.”

The Ukraine war shows that the European and Indo-Pacific theaters are in fact more closely connected than described in the NDS. This is not only because of uncertainty about the PRC’s intentions and its potential role as an arms supplier for Russia; it is also about the potential, persistent synergies Moscow and Beijing might realize from increased cooperation, and even coordination, in exploiting U.S. and allied vulnerabilities and in weakening Washington’s ability to safeguard its vital interests in both theaters. Somewhat ironically, Taiwan recently urged Washington to stay the course in Ukraine, in part because its leaders recognize the interconnectedness of the threats in the two theaters. And yet, the unclassified version of the NDS devotes a single line to the PRC-Russia relationship, noting that while its depth may remain limited due to mistrust, its breadth appears to be growing. Even if the depth of the relationship remains constrained, the negative implications for Beijing if Russia experiences a strategic defeat in Ukraine are difficult to overstate.

In the nuclear realm, the 2022 NPR reflects a thorough understanding of Russia’s threat. Appropriately, it retains a high bar for U.S. nuclear employment, and it affirms the U.S. nuclear modernization effort (while canceling unnecessarily redundant components, like nuclear-armed sea-launched cruise missiles). It also commits the United States to strengthened, regionally tailored extended deterrence and allied assurance, while preserving nuclear arms control and risk reduction strategies to reduce the dangers of miscalculation. Since Russia’s suspension of its participation in New START in February 2023, the Biden administration has left the door open for Russia’s return to the treaty and publicly countered Russian disinformation about the causes of suspension. The United States has also committed to abiding by the central limits of New START for as long as Russia does so and has professed a willingness to engage Russia without preconditions on a post-2026 arms control framework. That willingness may well go unanswered: Russia is unlikely to return to compartmentalizing nuclear arms control for as long as it is waging war against Ukraine. Still, the United States should continue to present itself as a responsible nuclear actor in order to rally international opinion against Russia’s rogue behavior. In response to Russia’s announced nuclear deployment in Belarus and insinuations about nuclear testing, Washington should try to anticipate further steps Russia might take to raise the credibility of its nuclear coercion and continuously share its assessments with allies and partners to enhance assurance. Finally, it is worth continuously reassessing whether the modernization of the U.S. nuclear triad sufficiently addresses not just Russia’s modernization in strategic offensive arms but also its versatile arsenal of theatre-range nuclear systems and prospective Russian missile defense capabilities.

Below the strategic level, Russia’s changing military threat to Europe over the near term holds implications for how the United States operationalizes the NDS in Europe, especially in terms of refining U.S. force structure, posture, and security cooperation with allies and partners. After Russia’s reinvasion of Ukraine, Washington responded to the crisis by surging 20,000 service members to Europe, bringing the total to more than 100,000 U.S. troops on the continent. It also sent additional warships to Spain, deployed jet squadrons to the United Kingdom, moved additional troops to Romania, shifted air defense units to Germany and Italy, and sent a range of assets to the Baltic states. These decisions reflected a sense of crisis early in the conflict, as well as some uncertainty about Putin’s unpredictable decisionmaking in the wake of his full-scale invasion. Now that the war has entered its second year and Russia’s military potential has evolved as a result, the United States might consider refining its forward-stationed and rotationally deployed capabilities as well as their specific locations. Broadly, Washington should focus on augmenting capabilities or capacities that counter residual Russian conventional strengths, but which are in short supply among European allies.

Washington should focus on augmenting capabilities or capacities that counter residual Russian conventional strengths, but which are in short supply among European allies.

This includes prioritizing the recapitalization of allied militaries and working to strengthen counter-UAV, anti-armor, and EW capabilities for the alliance and, also, for Ukraine. EW remains an integral and growing part of Russia’s demonstrated way of war. Despite some operational limitations, Russia has effectively used EW to down Ukrainian UAVs in high numbers, intercept and decrypt Ukrainian communications, and create fake UAV targets to consume Ukrainian supplies. Significantly bolstered counter-EW capabilities in Europe are necessary given Russia’s heavy reliance on jamming networks and systems, both military and commercial. Meanwhile, effective U.S. and allied offensive EW could dramatically worsen Russia’s already poor cross-domain command and control, inhibiting its ability to coordinate, especially between air and ground assets. This could be achieved through more rapid fielding of the U.S. Army’s most advanced EW tactical platforms — like the Terrestrial Layer System-Brigade Combat Team — as well as by making those platforms available to key European allies, including in northeastern Europe.

Washington should also look to bolster its air and missile defense capabilities in Europe. While residual Russian long-range fires may lack precision and ubiquity given the challenges posed to Moscow by sanctions and export controls, Russia maintains some capacity for missile launches — including hypersonic missiles — and loitering uncrewed airborne munitions. The key will be to field relatively cheap air and missile defense capabilities in Europe — such as directed energy weapons — versus more high-demand, low-density assets like Patriot units. European programs such as the German-led European Sky Shield Initiative are focused on filling some of these gaps with off-the-shelf solutions from outside the European Union. Ubiquitous, effective, and relatively cheap air and missile defense capabilities could help keep the long-range threat at bay, frustrate Russian intentions, and support allied efforts to acquire interoperable systems in a critical capability area. Such short-term planning must be balanced, however, by efforts at the European level to foster more EU cooperative development of such systems and strengthen and consolidate the European industrial base.

In terms of U.S. force posture, frontline allies — especially the Baltic states, Romania, and Poland — are eager to retain continuous U.S. military presence on their territory. For some capabilities, this makes sense operationally. For instance, establishing a forward-stationed U.S. corps headquarters is necessary for command and control of Europe-based U.S. assets and deployed Europe-bound assets, as well as for allied leadership. Similarly, returning at least one armored brigade to Europe permanently would likely prove less costly than rotating a similar unit from the continental United States, necessary in any case for countering Russian armor. Additional capabilities that might be forward-stationed include enablers such as air and missile defense units, long-range fires resident in multi-domain task forces, corps-level ISR and logistics capabilities, and combat aviation units — all capabilities that Europeans lack, or at least lack enough of. From a fiscal perspective, the expenses associated with transoceanic movement of these equipment-intensive units as well as the necessity of specialized regional knowledge and relationships make forward stationing a preferable alternative to rotational stationing. Moreover, given the willingness of Poland, the Baltic states, and Romania to host U.S. forces, cost-sharing arrangements make one-time infrastructure expenses relatively low.

Finally, the United States should accelerate plans to strengthen Ukraine’s military and turn it into a bulwark of qualitative advantage relative to Russia over the longer term. Given Russia’s challenges on the battlefield in 2022 and its lackluster offensive in early 2023, it is appealing to think that Ukraine might achieve a strategic victory, bringing about a quick end to the conflict. However, there is still the potential for a protracted stalemate across eastern and southeast Ukraine with sporadic violence. In this regard, the recently announced commitment to train Ukrainian pilots on F-16s is a step in the right direction. Beyond this and over the medium term, Washington should consider transferring to Ukraine more border monitoring capabilities that could strengthen defenses against and canalize overt or covert invasion forces; static and mobile ground- and air-domain awareness capabilities to strengthen border control; and offensive cyber and EW capabilities to exploit poor Russian cross-domain command and control. Washington should focus on building Ukraine’s edge as quickly as possible while exploiting Russia’s weaknesses, especially its access to advanced Western technology, which is currently limited.

Reassessing NATO’s Approach to Russia

NATO’s approach to Russia is guided by the North Atlantic Council, the alliance’s main decisionmaking body, and by the interests of its 31 independent member states. NATO’s approach is then expressed in its Strategic Concept, an overarching strategy document which has been updated approximately once per decade since the end of the Cold War. NATO’s new 2022 Strategic Concept marked a dramatic shift in the alliance’s overall approach to Russia. The previous strategy, adopted in 2010, sought a strategic partnership with Russia. It described the Euro-Atlantic region as “at peace” and NATO’s purpose as safeguarding freedom and security for its members. In contrast, the 2022 Strategic Concept acknowledged Europe is not at peace and it declared Russia to be the “most significant and direct threat to Allies’ security and to peace and stability in the Euro-Atlantic.” The new strategy updated NATO’s purpose — collective defense — and its three core tasks — defense and deterrence, crisis prevention and management, and cooperative security — to reflect this new reality.

NATO’s 2022 Strategic Concept prioritizes Russia as the central, direct threat to the Euro-Atlantic region, followed by the continuing threat of terrorism, which is especially important for allies across NATO’s southern borders; however, it identifies the PRC as a mere “challenge” to NATO’s interests, security, and values. Much like the 2022 U.S. National Defense Strategy, NATO’s Strategic Concept commits only a single line to cooperation or the synergies between Russia and the PRC, and it suggests allies need to improve their shared awareness and build resilience against PRC attempts to divide NATO and undermine the rules-based order. Though European assessments of the threat posed by China are rapidly moving closer to the U.S. view, some European allies still hesitate to consider the PRC a security threat to the Euro-Atlantic region. This divides the transatlantic community, and it weakens NATO’s ability to address the problems Beijing poses today in Europe, as well as the potential synergistic impact of Sino-Russian cooperation on Russia’s military threat to the Euro-Atlantic over the next two to four years.

Since the release of NATO’s 2022 Strategic Concept, Russia has demonstrated considerable weaknesses and poor performance on the battlefield in Ukraine, especially its inability to leverage its substantial quantitative advantages in manpower and in nearly every capability area. Moreover, the Wagner mutiny of June 2023 potentially cast into doubt perceptions of Russia as a unitary adversary. These weaknesses have prompted some allies, especially those in southern Europe who are more focused on terrorism and other challenges emanating from the Middle East or North Africa, to question the centrality of the Russian threat in NATO’s new strategy. There are also voices in the United States and in Western European capitals that express the same concerns. They recognize the need to respond to Russia’s military aggression in Ukraine, but they want to ensure that NATO retains its other core tasks and its ability to address very different security challenges in southern Europe. Nonetheless, given Russia’s residual military potential over the short run as outlined previously, NATO’s decision to place strategic focus on Russia — while preserving and updating its other core tasks — is appropriate and prudent.

In the nuclear realm, NATO’s Strategic Concept downgrades arms control as a tool for managing conflict, instead opening the aperture wide on ways to prevent unintentional conflict through nuclear risk reduction, transparency, conflict management, and confidence-building measures. NATO might continue to hone its focus on strategic risk reduction with Russia, taking unilateral steps that reduce the risk of nuclear war without compromising allied defense and deterrence. While NATO should factor Russia’s announced deployment of nuclear weapons to Belarus into its future posture planning, the alliance should resist the urge to abandon its “three nos” — no intention, no plan, and no reason — to deploy nuclear weapons on the territory of new members. During the current Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty review cycle, the allies might also consider adopting a more forward-leaning approach in discussing their nuclear-sharing arrangements to counter misinformation, including among nonaligned states — not only regarding Russia’s planned nuclear deployments to Belarus, but also regarding the U.S. trilateral security pact with the United Kingdom and Australia (AUKUS) and the nature of the U.S. alliance with the Republic of Korea.

Regarding conventional forces, NATO has finalized its new regional and domain-specific operational plans based on the threats posed by Russia as well as by other state and potential non-state actors considered important by the 31 NATO allies. These plans mark a new direction for the alliance, and they reflect the fact that collective defense and deterrence has, once again, become NATO’s top priority, just as it was during the Cold War. The plans also reflect a relatively new approach to defense and deterrence; previously, the alliance based its operational planning on somewhat more vague operational typologies. Given developments on the battlefield in Ukraine, the Wagner mutiny, and the war’s short-term impact on the Russian military, however, the assumptions underpinning NATO’s new plans should not be based on a static picture of Russia’s military potential. The alliance needs to ensure that its plans are not only credible but that they are agile, and that they can evolve, especially in the short term. To do this, NATO should routinely exercise its plans in tabletop training events; frequently incorporate intelligence on Russian capabilities and capacity, military morale, and cohesion; and fold the lessons learned back into plan refinement.

In addition to testing, exercising, and regularly refining its operational plans with updated assessments of Russia’s changing military potential, NATO should recalibrate its defense planning efforts to prioritize the acquisition of the capabilities and capacities best suited to leverage Russia’s demonstrated weaknesses in the Ukraine war and account for its residual strengths. For example, given Moscow’s undersea capabilities and its likely increased willingness to engage in hybrid operations against the alliance, NATO member states should strengthen subsurface situational awareness, particularly when it comes to critical undersea communications and energy linkages. This is especially true in the Black Sea given European interests in extending ties to the South Caucasus. NATO’s new undersea infrastructure coordination cell should help in this regard, but beyond information sharing it remains to be seen whether NATO’s littoral states will or can acquire the capabilities to deter and defend against Russian vessels conducting hybrid operations in particular.

Similarly, NATO might focus on efforts to counter other Russian tools of hybrid warfare, including those related to media control or manipulation and information warfare, not only in allied territory but among vulnerable partners in the post-Soviet space. This might include media literacy support, efforts to boost transparency in ownership, or efforts to replicate the role that Starlink has played in facilitating access to the internet and other media in authoritarian states or regions occupied by authoritarian states. Beyond this, however, allies are likely to remain reluctant to agree on a more forward-leaning or offensive operational approach to hybrid warfare outside the context of a crisis or conflict. Although NATO adopted a counter-hybrid strategy in 2015, its toolbox for countering hybrid threats is almost exclusively defensive — and, ultimately, the allied nations still have primary responsibility for addressing these threats. It is more likely that those allies with offensive hybrid capabilities might take responsibility for conducting such operations individually or in coordination with other like-minded allies. NATO might provide a venue for the coordination or deconfliction of such activities.

Additionally, given the role sanctions evasion plays in facilitating Russia’s production or acquisition of tanks, missiles, UAVs, aircraft, and EW capabilities, NATO defense planning should prioritize capabilities to counter conventional Russian military strengths at scale. Allies have increased their defense spending since 2014 primarily to modernize their national forces, not necessarily to build additional capacity. The legacies of low investment, diverging national interests, and the sheer number of systems produced to different national specifications all combine to prevent the European allies from achieving economies of scale or surge capacity. NATO should be the primary standards setter and a catalyst (alongside the European Union) for more multinational and multiyear procurement processes.

The challenges associated with force projection and the weakness Russia continues to evince in command and control of multi-domain operations suggest that the most significant threats are to those allies contiguous to Russian territory — especially Finland, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, and Poland. Given the difficulty of reinforcing these states from the Atlantic during a crisis or heightened tensions, in-place sustainment capabilities — including resupply of ammunition, spare parts, and fuel, as well as combat support capabilities such as communications, EW, and intelligence-collecting platforms — should be ranked especially high on NATO’s capabilities target list for the near term. NATO might also support stronger border security, particularly for allies that border Russia (and Belarus) as a means of repelling small-scale incursions by Russian special forces, especially those that might ostensibly begin as exercises.

Achieving these defense planning objectives at scale is particularly important given the possibility of a contingency in the Indo-Pacific theater. In such a scenario, the United States might need to shift some assets from Europe to the Indo-Pacific, not unlike it did during the Vietnam War era. As was the case then, the United States would expect European allies to fill any gaps, and it might expect certain allies — such as the United Kingdom and France — to make some contributions to military efforts in the Indo-Pacific. The gaps in Europe could be acute in terms of air and missile defense, long-range fires, medium and heavy airlift, combat aircraft, command and control, ammunition, and spare parts for a wide variety of systems and platforms. NATO might leverage its defense planning process now to build up large-scale hardened stores of critical supplies and equipment, as well as to plan for the larger European troop formations necessary to achieve deterrence by denial in the Baltic region and to respond to a large-scale conventional crisis.

In terms of how and where NATO arrays its capabilities, as foreshadowed above, the alliance would be better prepared to counter Russia’s changing military potential in the next two to four years if it embraced a true deterrence-by-denial force posture along the eastern flank — especially in the Baltic states, by stationing full brigades in each. Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania lack the strategic depth of Poland or Finland, and therefore their defense and reinforcement is inherently more challenging, especially in a crisis’s early stages when key alliance members may still be reluctant to engage in a large-scale reinforcement effort for fear of it being perceived as escalatory. In-place forces are therefore critical.

NATO must also preserve political unity, so efforts to assist Ukraine through NATO structures and processes will likely remain limited. This means that, aside from consistent messaging of long-term political support for Ukraine, the Comprehensive Assistance Package, and potentially more support for resilience and capacity building, NATO will continue to play a limited role in the war. For some observers, it might appear as if the alliance is hamstrung, and to some degree this may be a valid criticism. Nonetheless, NATO functions as the critical framework within which mini-lateral or ad hoc coalitions among like-minded allies can occur. It is partly because of the day-to-day experience of working together that the allies have been able to orchestrate such significant assistance to Ukraine through the U.S.-led Ramstein Group. NATO’s limited formal role also protects it from fulfilling the Kremlin’s false narrative, which frames the war as a conflict between Russia and NATO, rather than as Moscow’s effort to destroy Ukrainian statehood and national identity.

NATO’s limited formal role also protects it from fulfilling the Kremlin’s false narrative, which frames the war as a conflict between Russia and NATO, rather than as Moscow’s effort to destroy Ukrainian statehood and national identity.

Conclusion

Russia’s war of aggression in Ukraine has already had devastating consequences for the Ukrainian state, its economy, and its people; it will take generations to recover from this war. The war is also completely transforming the European security landscape, upending nearly all of the assumptions that previously guided U.S. and European — particularly Western European — strategies and policies toward Russia and eastern Europe. The war in Ukraine is now at the center of what is likely to be a long-term political confrontation pitting Russia against the United States and its allies and partners. Because battlefield circumstances are changing rapidly and the war’s outcome is still unpredictable, it is critical that the United States and NATO continuously reassess the conflict’s impact on Russia’s military potential and its evolving military threat to the Euro-Atlantic region.

It is impossible to predict when or how the war in Ukraine might end, so trying to gauge Russia’s evolving military potential over the next two to four years with any precision is very challenging. Ukraine could break through Russia’s defenses; a war of attrition could continue for the foreseeable future; Russia could bow out due to political divisions exemplified by the Wagner mutiny; or the conflict could freeze along the front lines, which would enable Russia to rearm, regroup, and try again to achieve its strategic objectives in the future. What is certain, though, is that the challenges that Russia’s military presents to the Euro-Atlantic region are changing because of developments in the war, Russia’s growing experience with the conflict and its own learning processes, and its ability to circumvent some U.S. and EU sanctions and export controls. Russia’s military has demonstrated operational weaknesses and it has lost manpower and equipment; still, Moscow retains important capabilities — some of which have not been touched by the war — and it is finding ways to field older equipment effectively. Russia’s military threat to the West is reduced in the short run, but to be sure, it is neither minimal nor one-dimensional.

In particular, Russia’s nuclear arsenal; the advanced air and ground systems it holds in reserve; and its significant EW, undersea, anti-satellite, cyber, and information warfare capabilities all still pose major challenges to the United States and its NATO allies. Meanwhile, given where Western sanctions have had some impact, it seems likely Russia will continue to pursue a strategy of attrition, leveraging its limited precision or advanced weaponry and its ubiquitous older, lower-quality weapon systems. Russia is a learning adversary, however, and it will likely devote significant resources to adaptation and to its military reconstitution. The United States and its European allies have also struggled to ramp up their own domestic industrial production, and they are facing urgent needs to fill gaps, replenish stockpiles, and make good on their promises to support Ukraine for as long as it takes. As a result, the short-term military challenge that Russia poses to the West is much different than it appeared in late 2021 or in early 2022.

To some degree, the 2022 U.S. and NATO strategies account for the dramatic changes in the European security environment — but implementing them will require agility and adaptation. Broadly, the United States and the NATO alliance should adapt their short-term approaches in ways that target Russia’s weaknesses and offer defense and deterrence against Russia’s remaining strengths, especially in the EW, cyber, and nuclear realms. The U.S. strategy could better account for the interconnectedness of the European and Indo-Pacific theaters, recognize potential debilitating fissures in Russian society, and focus on augmenting capabilities and capacities to counter Russian strengths, especially those that are in short supply in Europe. NATO allies, on the other hand, should also collectively grapple with the Russia-China relationship in their strategies, acknowledge the potential for divisions within Russia to destabilize Europe, and adapt their defense and operational planning to acquire and exercise the capabilities and capacities that are best suited to leverage Russia’s short-term weaknesses and account for its residual strengths.

The short-term military challenge that Russia poses to the West is much different than it appeared in late 2021 or early 2022.

Over the long run, the United States and its NATO allies and partners in Europe hold significant structural advantages over Russia. They have much larger and more dynamic economies. They have much larger populations and more favorable demographic trends, and, perhaps most importantly, they are united by principles and values — such as individual liberty, democracy, human rights, and the rule of law. These values may be the West’s most powerful tools; authoritarian leaders are having to take increasingly draconian measures to control and suppress their populations. The longer-term balance of power favors the West, but Washington and its NATO allies and partners cannot be complacent vis-à-vis a changing Russian military threat to the Euro-Atlantic region, especially while such a brutal and consequential war is underway in the heart of Europe. Understanding and responding to the evolving nature of Russia’s military potential is critical to transatlantic security both today and tomorrow.

Lisa Aronsson is a research fellow at the Center for Strategic Research at the Institute for National Strategic Studies at National Defense University. Her research focuses on European security and transatlantic defense cooperation, and her interests include NATO, the European Union, NATO partnerships, Black Sea security, and gender. She is also a nonresident senior fellow at the Atlantic Council, where she is affiliated with the Transatlantic Security Initiative in the Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security.

John R. Deni is a research professor of joint, interagency, intergovernmental, and multinational ( JIIM) security studies at the U.S. Army War College’s (USAWC) Strategic Studies Institute (SSI). He is also a non-resident senior fellow at the Atlantic Council, an associate fellow at the NATO Defense College, and an adjunct lecturer at American University’s School of International Service.

Hanna Notte is a senior associate (non-resident) with the Europe, Russia, and Eurasia Program at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS). Her expertise is on Russian foreign policy, the Middle East, and arms control and nonproliferation. She is the director of the Eurasia Nonproliferation Program at the James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies (CNS) in Monterey, California.